St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Bankruptcy Research Library

Center for Bankruptcy Studies

2017

Ability to Avoid Successor Liability Pursuant to a §363 Sale In
Bankruptcy
Julie Lavoie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Research Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Bankruptcy Studies at St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bankruptcy Research Library by an
authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
selbyc@stjohns.edu.

with any residual assets and liabilities and, as seen in Motors Liquidation, will often proceed to
arrange a plan for liquidation.7
An additional benefit of § 363 is that the sale can be “free and clear of any interest in
such property.”8 After the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Motors Liquidation, however,
there is concern about the efficacy of § 363(f)’s “free and clear” provision.9 Specifically, this
holding raises the issue of whether or not § 363(f) can validly prevent third parties from asserting
successor liability claims against those who purchase businesses out of bankruptcy.
This article explains how, going forward, courts will likely address the successor liability
of purchasers of assets pursuant to § 363 sales. In essence, the outcome will be largely dependent
on how a particular court interprets the meaning and scope of the term “interest” in § 363(f).
Section I explains both the broad and narrow definitions that are currently in use, with an
emphasis on the more widely used broad definition and the Second Circuit’s reasoning for
applying it in Motors Liquidation. Section II discusses the implications of each definition,
respectively, in terms of the strength of the § 363 liability shield. Section III addresses the Due
Process Clause concerns raised by the prevailing broad definition, and the impact of Motors
Liquidation’s outcome in relation to due diligence standards. The article concludes with an
assessment of the extent to which successor liability can be avoided using a § 363 sale.

7

See id. at 146.
11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
9
See 829 F.3d 135 (holding that the free and clear provision in the Sale Order, which governed transfer of Old GM’s
assets to New GM, could not absolve new GM of liability arising out of economic loss from ignition-switch
defects); see also Trevor B. Swett III, “Free and Clear” Bankruptcy Sale Orders and State-Law Successor Liability
Claims: The Overlooked Question of Preemption (2017) at 3 (stating that the Motors Liquidation ruling “will
predictably stimulate challenges” to free and clear sale orders entered into “when undisclosed or after-arising
liabilities of the debtors emerge.”)
8
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I.

Free and Clear of What?

Under § 363(f), a sale of property can be “free and clear of any interest in such property”
if: (1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits such sale; (2) the party asserting the interest
consents; (3) “such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is sold is greater than
the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or” (5)
the interest holder “could be compelled in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.”10 There is a considerable amount of ambiguity surrounding the
meaning and scope of this provision because “interest” is not defined in the Code.11 Accordingly,
bankruptcy courts around the country disagree about whether it should have a broad or narrow
definition.12 Some courts have limited “interest” to “in rem interests or interests that run with the
property.”13 Nevertheless, courts “seem[s] to be in favor of a broader definition that encompasses
other obligations that may flow from ownership of the property.”14

10

11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 363.06 [1].
12
See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 124 (2d Cir. 2009).
13
Larry Schnapf, 363 Sales Continue to Play Important Role in Corporate Transactions, ABA Business Law
Section (2010); See In re Wolverine Radio Corp., 930 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that an experience rating,
used to gauge an employer’s rate of contribution, is not an interest within the meaning of § 363(f) because it is a
“general unsecured interest” that does not “attach to property ownership so as to cloud its title”); see also In re
Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (asserting that § 363(f) does not authorize sales
free and clear of any interest, but rather of “any interest in such property,” the latter three words limiting the
interests impacted to in rem interests that have attached to the property, not in personam liabilities).
14
3 Collier on Bankruptcy 363.06 [1]; see In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
Coal Act premium payment obligations were “interests ” because “while the plain meaning of the phrase ‘interest in
such property’ suggests that not all general rights to payment are encompassed by the statute, Congress did not
expressly indicate, by employing such language, it intended to limit the scope…to in rem interests, strictly
defined”); see also In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Plaintiff’s interests in
travel vouchers that were issued to settle employment discrimination claims are not in rem interests but nevertheless
are interests under §363(f) “in the sense that they arise from the property being sold.”); see also In re PBBPC, Inc.,
484 B.R. 860, (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that the more expansive reading of the term ‘any interest’
advanced by the Seventh, Fourth, Third, and Second Circuits…is more consistent with the language of the
Bankruptcy Code and the policy expressed in § 363”). Given this interpretation’s pervasiveness, the trend seems
unlikely to reverse itself. See Kuny, George, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section §363(f) and Undermining the
Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 243 (2002) (“Even though § 363’s language does not support the
breadth of interpretation that courts have imposed, this trend appears unlikely to reverse itself.”).
11
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In Motors Liquidation, the court adopted this broader interpretation of “interest” holding
that successor liability claims are interests under § 363 if they qualify as “claims” under the
Bankruptcy Code.15 The court recognized that §363(f) does not “expressly invoke the Chapter 11
definition of claims,” nonetheless, given the expanded role of §363 in bankruptcy proceedings, it
makes sense to ‘harmonize’ Chapter 11 reorganizations and §363 sales ‘to the extent permitted
by the statutory language.’”16 Citing the relevant case law defining “claims,” the court
summarized:
“A bankruptcy court may approve a § 363 sale ‘free and clear’ of successor
liability claims if those claims flow from the debtor’s ownership of the sold
assets. Such a claim must arise from (1) a right to payment (2) that arose before
the filing of the petition or resulted from pre-petition conduct fairly giving rise to
the claim. Further, there must be some contact or relationship between the debtor
and the claimant such that the claimant is identifiable.”17
The view that “claims” qualify under § 363(f) as “interests” is pervasive and loudly defended.18
II.

Implication of Defining “Interests” to Include “Claims” in Terms of Successor Liability

The prevailing broad definition of “interest” that encompasses “claims,” allows § 363(f)
to “cut off successor liability that, under applicable nonbankruptcy law, could lie against the
purchaser” after a § 363 sale.19 Generally, a purchaser of assets does not assume the liabilities of
the seller absent an express agreement to do so or an exception to the rule.20 “Successor liability

15

See 829 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. (quoting In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining “claim” as
“any right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidation, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured).
17
829 F.3d at 156.
18
See Kuny, George, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section §363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process,
76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 235, 258 (2002) (“State and federal decisions holding a bankruptcy purchaser liable as a
successor of the debtor are directly at odds with Congressional intent to allow a debtor to sell its assets free and clear
of all claims and interests therein…Absent evidence of collusion or strong public policy concerns enunciated by
Congress, a bankruptcy purchaser should not be held liable for a debtor's obligations”).
19
See id. at 259.
20
See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 363.06 [7].
16
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is an equitable exception to this rule.”21 Though the doctrine is a creature of state law and thus
varies from state to state, generally, successor liability does not attach unless: “(1) the purchaser
expressly or impliedly assumed the liability; (2) the transaction amounted to a merger or
consolidation of the businesses; (3) the purchaser was merely a continuation of the seller; or (4)
the transaction was entered into fraudulently in order to avoid liability for the obligations.”22 In
sum, “successor liability [claims] arises out of the actions of the purchaser, not the property
itself” and therefore, “are not properly viewed as in rem claims.”23 Thus, jurisdictions that
strictly define “interest” as in rem, would not use §363(f)’s liability shield to block successor
liability claims that would otherwise exist under applicable nonbankruptcy statutory and
common law.24
In contrast, within jurisdictions that have concluded that claims are a subset of “interest”
under §363(f), “the dominant interpretation is that § 363(f) can be used to sell property free and
clear of claims that could otherwise be assertable against the buyer of the assets under the
common law doctrine of successor liability.”25 Similarly, courts have also used § 363(f) to bar
statutory successor liability claims.26

21

Id.
Id.
23
Kuny, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. at 260-61; See also In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. at 920-21 (“[W]hile
successor liability may give a party an alternative entity from whom to recover, the doctrine does not convert the
claim to an in rem action”).
24
See Kuny, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. at 263; see also Nathan F. Coco, Note, An Examination of Successor Liability in
the Post-Bankruptcy Context, 22 J. Corp. L. 345, 356 (1997) (“Because successor liability is by its nature an in
personam claim, it is not extinguished by the mere transfer of assets achieved by §363(f)”).
25
Kuny, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. at 267; See Forde v. Kee-Lox Mfg. Co., 437 F. Supp. 631 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding
that sale free and clear bars civil rights suit based upon pre-sale conduct of businesses, aff’d, 584 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1978); see also In re. All. Am. of Ashburn, Inc., 56 B.R. 186 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that assets had been
sold free and clear of interests, including successor liability claims based on cases concluding that claims are a
subset of interest), aff’d, 805 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1986).
26
See Kuny, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. at 268.
22

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

5

III.

Due Process Concerns

Allowing §363(f) sales to be free and clear of successor liability claims gives rise to due
process issues.27 This is because, “[g]enerally, legal claims are sufficient to constitute property
such that a deprivation would trigger due process scrutiny.”28 Moreover, “an elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process…is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.”29 Due process was squarely at issue in Motors
Liquidation, and ultimately dictated the outcome because absent a finding that the ignition switch
plaintiffs’ due process rights were violated, the free and clear provision of the sale order would
have barred their claims.30 The court reasoned that because of ample evidence that Old GM
knew, or at the very least, should have known of the ignition-switch defects at the time of the §
363 sale, the plaintiffs were entitled to actual notice, not merely the notice by publication that
they received.31 Going forward, this outcome will serve to set a higher due diligence standard for
purchasers.32
Conclusion
The extent to which a buyer can avoid successor liability by purchasing a debtor’s assets
free and clear under § 363(f) of the Code, depends on whether the adjudicating court limits the

27

See id. at FN 107.
Motors Liquidation, 829 F.3d at 158 (citing N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156, 169-70 (2d
Cir. 2001).
29
Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
30
See Motors Liquidation, at 158, 166.
31
See id. at 159-60.
32
Randles, Jonathan, 2nd Circ. Says ‘Buyer Beware in GM Ruling on Ch. 11 Sale, Law 360, July 15,
2016, https://www.law360.com/articles/817545/2nd-circ-says-buyer-beware-in-gm-ruling-on-ch-11sale?article_related_content=1 (suggesting that before entering a § 363 sale agreement, a potential purchaser should
“scrutinize a debtor’s business” to ensure debtors are forthright about any underlying issues and to be sure all known
and potential claimants are notified of the potential sale”).
28
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definition of “interests” to in rem interests. If so, the § 363(f) liability shield will not prevent
third parties from brining successor liability claims. However, to date, the notion that a buyer can
avoid successor liability by purchasing a debtor’s assets free and clear under §363, “has largely
prevailed in the courts.”33 That is because courts more frequently define “interests” to include all
interests that arise from the property being sold, thus encompassing successor liability claims.
However, as demonstrated by Motors Liquidation, even if a court adopts the broader definition,
successor liability can still be imposed, notwithstanding a valid liability shield, if any third
parties with “claims” that the debtor is aware of are not provided notice that complies with due
process.

33

Swett III at 3.
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